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time the zoning regulation was enacted. While the Bottlers were able to
show that the water from the spring had been extracted for personal
consumption for the last 200 years, they were unable to provide any
evidence that the spring water had been collected, stored, and transported
to be sold prior to 1991. Thus, the present use did not exist at the time the
zoning regulations were enacted. Therefore, the court concluded that the
zoning board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily, or abused its discretion in
dismissing the non-conforming use claim.
In addition, the court refused to contradict the zoning board's
decision that "harvesting of spring water" was not within the local zoning
regulation's definition of agriculture and/or farming. The court cited the
record concerning the evidence considered at the public meeting on the
issue. The court also re-emphasized it recognized the wide and liberal
discretion of a local authority in such a determination. Therefore, the
court concluded that the Somers Zoning Board had weighed all of the
appropriate evidence on the issue, and had come to a reasonable decision.
Because the decision was within the board's discretion, the court dismissed
the claim.
Kirk Waible

FLORIDA
Brevard County v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 742 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an order restricting a county's drainage
discharge into a drainage easement in anticipation of future environmental
regulations was improper).
Brevard County ("County") acquired 240 acres of land owned by A.
Duda & Sons, Inc. ("Duda") in order to construct a wetland to aid in
wastewater treatment and disposal. Adding the wetland would increase the
facilities' disposal capacity. The County entered an order of taking for the
240 acres; however, it had to file an amended petition to acquire an
easement over Duda's land known as the 4-Mile Canal. The County
needed the easement so that treated water could flow from the wetland to
Lake Winder, where the treated effluent ultimately ended up.
The possibility that pollutant loading reduction goals and total
maximum daily loads could be imposed on the 4-Mile Canal increased the
chances that pollutants from the County would substantially lessen the
amount of pollutants Duda could discharge from his ranch. Duda wanted a
restriction on the County's use of the easement. The County agreed in
some respects and disagreed in others.
The parties agreed to a non-exclusive easement that could only be used
for specific purposes such as treated effluent or stormwater conveyance, or
water intake from the 4-Mile Canal. The County would have to adhere to
the pollution limits set in the Wastewater Facility Permit and the
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Environmental Resource Permit governing the Wetlands Disposal System
("System").
Duda did not waive his right to challenge permit
modifications, but did waive the right to challenge the County's legal
interest in a non-exclusive easement. In addition, the County agreed to
take necessary steps to insure that Duda maintained his ability to use his
land. Such steps could include, but would not be limited to, reducing
pollution from the System and installing additional treatment facilities.
However, the County would only have to take steps to eliminate the
System's operations effects. If the County failed to take these necessary
steps, Duda would have a cause of action in eminent domain for the
resulting damages. Both parties agreed to these stipulations, which became
paragraph five of the supplemental order.
Both parties did not agree to the language in paragraph six. The trial
court adopted the language in Duda's proposal. The Florida Court of
Appeals found that in doing this, the trial court had exceeded its authority
in requiring the County to "take steps in the future to reduce or eliminate
contaminants to meet unascertained standards." The court also found the
County's proposal insufficient in that it failed to compensate Duda for the
current taking and limited compensation for possible future takings. In
addition, the County's proposal only addressed the issue of Duda's ability
to discharge phosphorus or nitrogen and did not address other pollutants.
Since deleting paragraph six was not an option, the appellate court vacated
the entire order and remanded for entry of a new one.
Rebekah King

Palm Coast Util. Corp. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comrn'n, 742 So. 2d 482
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the Florida Public Service
Commission failed to provide evidentiary support for changes to certain
components of its rate-fixing methodology for utility).
Palm Coast Utility Company ("Palm Coast") provided water and
wastewater services to customers in Flagler County, Florida. The Florida
Public Service Commission ("Commission") granted Palm Coast a rate
increase amount that was significantly less then the rate increase the utility
requested. Florida case and statutory law entitled a regulated utility to earn
a fair rate of return on its rate base, that is, capital prudently invested in
the utility's facilities that are used and useful in the public service. Thus,
in determining Palm Coast's rate base, the Commission was required to
determine the portion which was "used and useful" for each component of
Palm Coast's water and wastewater system.
Palm Coast appealed the Commission's final order. Palm Coast argued
that the Commission erroneously determined components of the utility's
rate base and raised seven issues on appeal. The court first discussed Palm
Coast's three main arguments. Palm Coast argued that the Commission
erroneously calculated the used and useful portions of the utility's plant by:

